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ALL THE KING’S HORSES AND ALL THE KING’S MEN:




In January 2003 the New Zealand government announced that it intended to redress the
fragmentation of the state sector that was brought about by the radical state sector
reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Eschewing any “big bang” restructuring,
over the next five years it proposes to enhance “coordination” among government
agencies -- by means that may include the establishment of “circuit-breaker teams” and
up to ten “super networks” to manage the proliferation of central government
organizations. It proposes to reverse in some instances the policy/operational split that
was imposed by the reforms, and seeks to achieve better integration between
operational “outputs” and policy “outcomes.” This article discusses the suitability of
these suggestions, in the light of a recent report by a government advisory group. This
report examines what are, in fact, major flaws in the original reforms yet suggests
remedies on the assumption that they are not. The case raises more general questions
about the relationship between the theoretical bases of public sector reform, on the one
hand, and practical experience on the other.
INTRODUCTION
Significant changes to the New Zealand state sector are advocated in a report by a
governmental advisory group on “The Review of the Center” (Report, 2001). The group
included the heads of the three central agencies – the Treasury, the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the State Services Commission -- together with two
independent consultants and the national secretary of the main state sector trade union,
the Public Service Association. It deliberated during a period of four months in 2001.
The Report recommended that the government should adopt a “whole of government”
perspective in addressing problems of coordination and integration that have resulted
from having about 170 central governmental agencies in a country with a population of
four million people (that is, roughly the size of Sydney).
Before its election in 1999 the government, as opposition, had frequently expressed
serious concerns over various aspects of Public Service management and culture, and its
announced intentions address some of those concerns. However, this article seeks to
argue that its decision to avoid any wholesale restructuring of the Public Service, on the
grounds that there has been far too much restructuring, and that such moves offer no
panacea, may reflect an underlying ambivalence about the nature of the problems and
the best means of dealing with them.
All theories are flawed, all practical systems have their weaknesses and unintended
consequences and reverse effects emerge out of all forms of social engineering. But
governmental policy on public management suffers if, in invoking what appear to
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cogent theoretical ideas, reformers are then unable or unwilling to test the validity of
these theories against practical experience.
This would seem to be especially so when reform is based on a theoretical paradigm
shift, in this case from traditional public administration to what became known as (and
has been subsequently disavowed as) New Public Management (NPM). The former had
evolved pragmatically in the light of practical experience, but with much less explicit
theoretical coherence than that of NPM. Public choice theorists have been roundly
critical of what they see as traditional public administration’s inability to offer rigorous,
parsimonious, theoretical explanations of bureaucratic and political behavior (Bendor,
Moe and Shotts, 2001). So any unwillingness to critically examine the new paradigm in
the light of practical experience is particularly ironic. Effective inter-disciplinary
communication in policymaking for public management is undoubtedly needed, as
Barzelay (2001) argues, but no less important is the need for critical reflection on
theoretical designs, by those who are intellectually wedded to them.
WHAT THE REPORT ADVOCATES
The authors of the report list important strengths in the New Zealand public
management system. These include: transparent financial management; better quality
client service; a commitment to fundamental values like democracy, the rule of law, and
accountability; freedom to manage on the basis of output accountability; and flexibility.
However, it argues that “some significant shifts in emphasis are needed to better
respond to the needs of the future”(Report: 4). Its tabular view of what it expects to be
different in five years time, for ministers, citizens, and staff, is shown in the appendix to
this article. This table is as much an implicit commentary on the failings of the current
system as it is a vision of a future one.
The report focuses on what its authors see as a pressing need to put the Public Service
back together again, to overcome “the loss of focus on the big picture that fragmentation
can cause” (Report: 4). Such fragmentation is apparent in “a proliferation of agencies”,
and of ministerial portfolios with “an excessive number of votes”, and in some areas
“by an over-emphasis on vertical accountabilities at the expense of whole of
government approaches” (Report: 4). According to the report:
Fragmentation makes coordinated service delivery more complicated, adds to the
costs of doing business, and blurs accountability for some issues. Structural
fragmentation means many small agencies, spreading leadership talent and other
skills more thinly and increasing the risk of weak capability. Fragmentation means
Ministers need to build relationships with multiple agencies, and at times
reconcile conflicting agency positions at an excessively detailed level.
Fragmentation can make alignment more difficult. (Report: 4)
It is not clear from the report what “alignment” actually means, though it can be inferred
from the suggested remedies that it is a mechanistic metaphor that envisages more
effective operational linkages among the multiple agencies that deliver services to the
public, from the center to the regions. It is very much about the quest for “joined up”
government, and (perhaps reflecting the views of the chief executives of the three
central departments) the need to strengthen central control.
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To this end the report suggests several “new ways of working”. These include inter-
agency “ ‘circuit-breaker’ teams to solve previously intractable problems in service
delivery by drawing on front-line knowledge and creativity with central technical
support” (Report: 7); replacing purchase agreements (between ministers and chief
executives) with “output plans”; enhanced monitoring of organizational performance;
the establishment of 7-10 “super networks” to better integrate policy, delivery and
capacity-building in the state sector; a “careful process of structural consolidation”
addressing the numbers of crown entities and small agencies, the effectiveness of
policy/operations splits, and ministerial concerns about performance or alignment
(Report: 7).
The report also advocates a shift back towards the concept of an integrated state sector
career service. With the aim of “enhancing the people and culture” of the state services,
initiatives would include the development of an “overarching human resource
framework, including clarity of what parts…to apply to which Crown entities”;
“Promotion of more widespread use by State sector organizations of generic public
sector standards and qualifications”; the development of “detailed proposals for a more
collective, centralized and consistent approach to the development of senior managers
across the Public Service…”; and “modelling and leading the development of a modern,
professional, Public Service culture…” ( Report: 8).
To these ends the report advocates that the three central agencies “collectively and
individually, exert more effective leadership across the wider State sector by formally
adopting as part of their core business a responsibility to lead the State sector on whole-
of-government initiatives” (Report: 8).
Where’s the theory?
As Hood (1995: 180) observes, “Most ideas in public administration have an earlier life
and times, and return and recurrence is a notable feature of its intellectual dynamic.”
However, historical pendulums never swing back to an original position. Imminent
change in the New Zealand state sector will constitute a new reality different from that
imposed by the earlier reforms, which placed New Zealand (for better or for worse) in
the vanguard of public administration reform in the western democracies, and different
again from the reality of the “old” state sector. But while the reformist pendulum of the
1980s and 90s swung sharply away from “rule-driven administration” to “results-
oriented management” the latest moves are more pragmatic and cautious. They are also
much less driven by appeal to any particular body of theoretical knowledge in the way
that the earlier changes were strongly influenced by institutional economics.
Public choice theory underpinned New Zealand’s attempts to institutionalize a clear
distinction between “outputs” and “outcomes”, with departmental chief executives
being responsible for the production of the former, and ministers being responsible for
the achievement of the latter. And it impelled the institutional separation of policy
agencies from operational ones as a means of overcoming the specter (sometimes real,
often imagined) of “provider capture” and of reaping the benefits of “contestability” in
policy markets which were usually imagined rather than real. The commitment by
institutional economics to positivist, mechanistic and liner-rational assumptions of
bureaucratic behavior strongly influenced the fragmentation of the formerly unified
Public Service into a collection of separate entities, each largely blinded to the wider
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political and administrative landscape by its own narrow concerns, not the least being
the increasingly specific accountability demands placed on them. Agency theory drove
the abolition of the unified state services career system, and with it the permanent tenure
of top public servants, and hugely reduced the role and functions of the central
personnel agency - the State Services Commission (SSC). Transactions costs analysis
informed the shift away, in rhetoric if by no means entirely in practice, from production
generated through quasi-markets rather than bureaucratic hierarchies.
In short, institutional economics places much more emphasis on risk management than
relational trust, on competition than cooperation, on markets than hierarchies, on
consumership than citizenship, on corporate management than democratic governance,
on accountability and efficiency than on responsibility and equity, on mechanistic
disaggregation (fragmentation) than organic holism. How else could institutional
economics “rediscover” the policy/administration dichotomy discarded by the older
paradigm about 50 years earlier?
The Review of the Center report appeals not at all to formal theoretical knowledge, at
least overtly, not even in respect of the role of “super networks” in overcoming
problems that are seen to result from excessive fragmentation. This omission implies
that the theoretical underpinnings of New Zealand’s state sector reforms are not to be
revisited in the light of subsequent experience, at least not by those who are now
advocating the above changes. Presumably this task, if considered worth doing at all,
may be left to academics. Some steps to this end are taken below. The report is
effectively an exercise in policy analysis, but as such it lacks the incisiveness found
several years earlier in the report provided by Schick (1996). The latter has been
described as “an exemplar of policy-oriented, academically rigorous analysis within the
New Public Management” (Barzelay, 2001: 162). The irony of this is that Schick’s
report has had relatively little practical impact, despite its apparent exemplary critical
rigour, whereas the current report might turn out to have substantial practical impact
(though what this will actually be remains to be seen).
The reasons for this, of course, are to be found in the political games of speaking truth
to power. Schick’s report can be read both as a glowing endorsement of the New
Zealand reforms, and as a rather veiled but in places pointed criticism of them. At the
time it was presented there was no serious political support for any major change to “the
New Zealand model”. But since then there have been any number of serious issues,
political shenanigans, and public controversies surrounding the state sector as a whole,
including the Public Service.1
It should also be remembered that the reforms of the 1980s and 90s were designed in
the main by practitioners, but practitioners (located in institutions like the Treasury and
the Reserve Bank) who were well schooled in and largely committed to institutional
economic interpretations of bureaucratic behavior (Goldfinch, 2000; Gregory, 1999;
Kelsey, 1995). While the current report was also authored largely by practitioners, at
least two of those – the heads of the Treasury and of the DPMC – are persons with
strong academic orientations, with doctorates in economics and public policy,
respectively. The State Services Commissioner (who has a graduate degree in political
science) has, since taking on the job in 1997, made it clear that he is more than
comfortable with the general shape of the Public Service as reconstituted by the
reforms.
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The report’s atheoretical tone might simply be an essentially parochial phenomenon,
peculiar to the New Zealand circumstances of the time. However, it might also
exemplify a more general transformational relationship between theoretical criticism
and practical experience in the field of public sector change (Christensen and Laegreid,
2001). So why does the lack of theoretical reflection in the current report matter? It
matters because the report manifests a strong propensity to talk out both sides of its
metaphorical mouth.
Two, mutually contradictory, views are apparent in prominent analyses of state sector
reform in New Zealand, both of which reflect the unwillingness to reconsider the
appropriateness of the original theoretical underpinnings against evolving experience.
On the one hand, there has been a willingness, such as that displayed in the current
report, to critically assess various practical dimensions of the reforms. This has also
been apparent, for example, in other critical contributions, notably by Graham Scott
(2001), who as then head of the Treasury was probably the main architect of the
changes; in a review by the SSC (1999) of means of improving accountability; and in a
commentary provided in his 2001 annual report by the State Services Commissioner
(SSC, 2001).
On the other hand, however, there has been a reluctance to admit the possibility (if not
the reality) that some of the original theoretical foundations, at least as applied in New
Zealand, might be seen to be basically unsound. The original reforms were based on a
body of theoretical analysis presented mainly by the Treasury (1987), and this analysis
in turn provided a conceptual blueprint for the radical transformation of the state sector.
Current critical appreciation has been largely disconnected from the original theoretical
framework. This might have been expected in the day-to-day pressures of “getting on
with the job”, but it also probably reflects the enduring ideological force of that
framework.
Opinions by well informed commentators and practitioners that the New Zealand model
is fundamentally sound are perfectly legitimate. But one person’s “fundamental
soundness” can be another’s “basic weakness”, a difference in perception that will often
be adequately explained by Miles’ Law: where you stand depends on where you sit.
Putting it more directly, while there is a willingness to identify fundamental flaws there
is an unwillingness to acknowledge that these are indeed fundamental flaws. Instead,
they tend to be spoken of as if they are shortcomings which can be adequately addressed
by marginal adjustments to the overarching New Zealand model, which has attracted so
much international attention (and praise) during the past decade, but which the current
report’s authors describe rather cautiously as “a reasonable platform from which to
work” (p. 4, emphasis added).
The SSC’s (1999) article on accountability, for example, addresses one important
reformist paradox, that which is commonly expressed in the cliché, “letting managers
manage and making them manage”. It discusses “the utility and proliferation of
accountability documents and the ex-ante and ex-post processes surrounding them”, but
it is at pains to state that, “These are not necessarily fundamental design flaws in the
New Zealand public management model itself, but are related to the way it has been
implemented and evolved over time” (Report: 3). The remainder of the article goes on
to provide an analysis, which suggests that the problems are in fact, more fundamental
than superficial. Similarly, the State Services Commissioner has commented that, “As
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our experience with the public management system increases, we see new strengths and
weaknesses and reassess those previously identified. He is, however, “firmly in the
camp of those who conclude from this process that the public management system,
especially that part designed to preserve the political neutrality of the Public Service, is
fundamentally sound” (SSC, 2001: 1).
Elsewhere he has observed that, “The transfer of service delivery functions out of
departments into separate legal entities that have adopted, consciously or unconsciously,
different corporate cultures probably has contributed to the change in long-established
Public Service values in these organizations.
I cannot accept that this is right and proper, particularly when, as far as the public is
concerned, all state sector organizations, regardless of their legal form, are part and
parcel of the same business” (SSC, 2001: 9). Also, the Commissioner “has come to the
view that [when operating as a dichotomy] the distinction between outcomes and
outputs can be unhelpful to, or even destructive of, the creative and supportive
relationship that should exist between Ministers and the organizations through which
they work” (SSC, 2001: 10). He was convinced that departments and other state sector
organizations needed to be “much more connected with what the government of the day
is trying to achieve than is possible to achieve with a contract for outputs” (SSC, 2001:
11). The Commissioner’s view was that a different approach to contracting was needed.
This would require contracts to focus not on the specific detail of outputs but on
“broadly-framed responsibilities including the responsibility to manage events as well
as possible” by stating “intermediate outcomes” (SSC, 2001: 11). These “would have to
link compellingly to the Government’s goals, allow progress towards those goals to be
measured, and allow the effectiveness of outputs to be assessed” (SSC, 2001: 11). These
concerns are reflected in the current report, which stresses the need for a stronger
emphasis on outcomes.
TRITE ANSWERS TO TOUGH PROBLEMS?
A closer inspection of some of the main systemic weaknesses discussed in the current
report indicates that the propensity to hedge reforming bets neither enhances critical
evaluation of the theoretical bases of the New Zealand model, nor augurs well for the
practical steps that might be taken to try to improve the system.
“Alignment”
In New Zealand, principal-agent theory was invoked in the 1980s to pursue stronger
alignment (although it was not then called this) between the policy intentions of the
government of the day and the administrative preoccupations of departmental heads.
Fixed-term contractual appointments replaced the tenure enjoyed by the former
permanent heads.
The current report, however, speaks pointedly of the need to enhance alignment, which
has been weakened by the effects of a bifurcated relationship between ministers
responsible for “outcomes” and chief executives responsible for the production of
“outputs”. It seeks to overcome this bifurcation by means such as (Report: 7),
“providing Ministers with a stronger mechanism for shaping departmental priorities
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through better engagement with departments around a statement of intent”; replacing
purchase agreements with “output plans”; “enhanced monitoring of organizational
performance”; “an accountability and reporting system that puts more emphasis on
outcomes and high level priorities, as well as output specification” (Report: 5);
“developing more effective, higher trust means of working together..” (Report: 6).
Better alignment will also be fostered, it is hoped, by other means, discussed below,
including the creation of “cross-agency circuit breaker” teams, and the establishment of
“super networks of related agencies “to integrate policy, delivery and capacity-building
in the state sector” (Report: 7).
Apparently, however, this bifurcation, together with the excessive fragmentation that
has resulted from the reformist preoccupation with mechanistic rather than organic
assumptions of public bureaucracy (Gregory 2001), are not to be interpreted as serious
weaknesses in the theoretical arguments which, in the tradition of unintended
consequences and reverse effects, have given rise to them, in New Zealand’s own
version of “Trobriand Cricket” (Hood, 2001).
There is nothing in the report about the possibility that these shortcomings have their
origins in one of the statutory pillars of the reforms, the Public Finance Act 1989, which
entrenched the output/outcome dichotomy. There is also nothing in the report to say that
if the serious problem of (mis) alignment is to be overcome then perhaps major changes
will be needed in this crucial piece of legislation.
Nor is there anything to suggest that the authors of the current report are prepared to
confront the obvious: that the increasingly problematic nature of the evolving
contractual relationship between ministers (responsible for outcomes and for purchasing
outputs) and chief executives (responsible for producing outputs) has had an adverse
effect on the relationship of trust that has always been and will continue to be central to
an effective partnership between both parties.2
For example, it was the contractual relationship between the chief executive of New
Zealand’s biggest department and the State Services Commissioner that enabled the
former to sue the latter in a high profile case brought before the Employment Court last
year (see Wallis, 2001). The claimant’s case failed, but not before the disclosure of
various hitherto private official conversations had been aired in public, leading to
suggestions that the case would have an adverse effect on relations between chief
executives, ministers, and the State Services Commissioner.
The Commissioner, however, does not agree. In his view the case was “an aberration”,
and he saw no evidence that the combination of circumstances, events and personalities
that led to this outcome are likely to recur. “Furthermore, I do not think our system of
public management could stand more than one such case without seriously undermining
the ability of the Government and Public Service to operate effectively. This, in itself,
provides a discipline on, and an incentive for, all parties to make our public
management arrangements work…[the ideal relationship between a Minister and chief
executive] ‘is one of trust between two people linked inextricably, at least for a time’.
This is the quality of the relationship needed for good government. It was the situation
that applied before the case. It applies still” (SSC, 2001: 4).
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He may be right in his expectation. But what if he is not? What does this case say, even
as a sort of counterfactual, about the impact of contractualism on the ministerial-chief
executive relationship that is so vital for the enhanced “alignment” that the current
report says is necessary for a better “whole of government” approach?
Moreover, the report might be in danger of encouraging another reverse effect. How
well does the call for enhanced monitoring of organizational performance sit with the
simultaneously espoused need to replace purchase agreements with output plans? Isn’t
this analogous to the paradox built into the earlier reforms, and now apparent in its
effects, when managers were to be both freed to manage and made to manage?
Fragmentation
Public choice theory’s ideas of “provider capture”, information asymmetries, and the
skewing of resource allocation by rent-seeking bureaucratic behavior underpinned what
has now come to be seen as excessive fragmentation in the form of policy ministries
separated from delivery organizations, and the large numbers of votes, and single-
mission agencies across the state sector.
Agency theory gave birth to contractualism, purchase agreements, target-setting,
performance measurement, and what is now seen as an excessive concern for vertical
accountability rather than horizontal integration.
The fact that these sorts of outcomes were not readily foreseen by reformers who were
committed to (blinkered by?) their rather narrow theoretical and conceptual perspectives
is not surprising. So perhaps it is not surprising either that even in hindsight there is an
unwillingness to link back to their theoretical foundations such unintended
consequences as excessive fragmentation and the lack of a whole of government
approach. Instead, the State Services Commissioner observes that, “Public service
delivery of Government programmes will be enhanced when policy development and
implementation are more integrated” (SSC, 2001: 24). But this statement not only
refutes what its author continues to uphold as valid (the original separation3) but also
belies the fact that, while the two may be distinguished conceptually, in practice they
are mutually constitutive (as Carl Friedrich once famously declared in so many words,
during his exchange with Herman Finer4). One is reminded of the perhaps apocryphal
story of Frederick Winslow Taylor: when he discovered that the behavior of some
individuals did not fit his theory of economically-induced production he determined not
that the theory was flawed but that the individuals were. In this form of “policy
analysis” theory rapidly becomes transmuted into dogma.
Thus, the current report is at pains to eschew any major structural reorganization as the
principal means of overcoming the problem of fragmentation and all that flows from it.
According to both the Minister of State Services and the Commissioner, there has been
too much of this and no “big bang” reorganization will be implemented to put together
what the original reforms tore asunder.5 Instead, change will be incremental, to the point
that in five years time the state sector will be “significantly different”, with fewer
departments and crown entities, and “some of the policy-operation splits could well be
reversed”.6 Humpty Dumpty will become a good egg again, piece by piece.
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The preferred means of reintegration are cross-agency “circuit-breaker teams” and
“super networks”. The former, which would not be “simply more committees”, are
intended “to solve previously intractable problems in service delivery by drawing on
front-line knowledge and creativity together with central technical support”, and would
“show that the center is serious about tapping the ideas of the frontline” (Report: 7, 21).
(By April 2003 three had been set up – on reducing school truancy, settling skilled
migrants, and preventing domestic violence.) The “more widespread and proactive use
of networks”, grouping and managing agencies in 7-10 “super networks” would
“represent a move towards substantial structural change” (Report: 5).
Again, does this response match the problem, either in theory or in practice? At the
theoretical level, there is little if any consideration of network theory (discussed below).
And the current report, having identified a major practical consequence of the original
theoretical design speaks as if the consequence were largely unrelated to that design.
This tendency to elide contrasts, for example, with another analysis of similar issues,
published only two or three years after the reforms. Galvin (1991) argued that the
changes in the decision-making process that occurred at the political level under the
Lange Government (responsible for the state sector reforms) had a strongly deleterious
effect on interdepartmental coordination and consultation.7 This was the source of the
growing emphasis on vertical, at the expense of, horizontal accountability (see
Considine, 2002). Moreover, since the 1980s there has been no return to the
departmental infrastructure of consultation, incorporating organizational “client”
groups, most of which was cut away on the basis of public choice interpretations of
rent-seeking official and interest group behavior.
The current government is undoubtedly correct in its view that another major
restructuring of the Public Service would be politically difficult to justify.
This is to suggest that the original radical reforms, coming after a period of many
decades of relative stability in state sector structures and processes, have exhausted the
political capacity for the sort of major reorganization that is needed to address the
problems identified in the current report. Radical restructuring seems no longer to be a
fashionable alternative, even though it may be the one that is actually required.
Instead, the creation of “circuit-breaker” teams, and “super networks” appears to be an
imaginatively innovative response. Perhaps it is a shrewd move towards more
comprehensive structural changes in the future, just as the corporatization of
government trading functions was in a number of cases a half-way step towards
privatization. However, maybe these proposals are a bit glib?
For example, if problems are indeed “intractable”, as described in the report, why
should “circuit-breaker teams”, operated with technical support from the center, be
expected to “solve” them? Intractability would seem to be a function of poor inter-
agency cooperation, which in turn is likely to flow from differing, perhaps conflicting,
organizational purposes, mind-sets, and interests. It’s promised that these teams will
“not be simply more committees” (p. 21), but why won’t they be?
In this connection, too, the center is said to be “serious about tapping into the ideas of
the front-line” (Report: 21). Perhaps, but there are also good reasons why the center is
not always interested in the experiences of “street-level” officials, even when policy
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advice and service delivery proceeds under structural unity rather than division. And the
report does not promise any major change from unity to division, despite its own
diagnosis of the pathologies deriving from that same division.
Instead, these teams are to undergo “an initial course in problem analysis, creativity and
change management” (Report: 21). If this terminology is not intended to be a
euphemistic patina for a course in bureaucratic politics then it is unlikely to have any
real impact on these “intractable” problems of service delivery.
“Super networks” - panacea or palliative?
The report advocates the establishment of “super networks” as a major response to
problems of fragmentation. But it is not clear why these innovations should be expected
to operate effectively, any more than the more localized “circuit-breaker” teams.
Fragmentation having resulted from flawed theory is not to be overcome by any serious
appeal to theory. Pragmatism is fine, of course, providing it is based on
commonsensical experience. The promise of super networks seems to be based on
neither. Practical experience, or “institutional memory” would have generated
knowledge of the real informal networks that characterized the Public Service before the
original reforms. These changes, in fact, in sweeping away the institutional frameworks
within which these networks operated also destroyed the networks. Others, of course,
have grown in their place, one of which shows that the informal path to departmental
chief executives’ positions tends to run via the Treasury (Boston, 2001).
Perhaps the current report puts the super network cart before the restructuring horse. If
better alignment is sought then maybe the government will need to bite the political
bullet and engage in major structural change to that end. Effective networks might be
not so much a substitute for restructuring as much as they are a consequence of it. They
might be more likely to emerge out of sound rather than unsound structural foundations,
where “sound” refers to hierarchies which have been constituted with an eye to the
requirements of “co-production” (Alford, 1993), in pursuit of separable but overlapping
purposes (for example, policing and social work).
Contemporary theory seems at best a little ambiguous on this point. For example, two
leading theoretical exponents in this field argue that, “What we do know is that no
system can be changed every few years and produce quality service. Continual change
increases the rewards for non-cooperation in an existing system, creating the impetus
for yet more change” (Milward and Provan (2000: 366). But the authors also argue that,
“What holds for economic growth also holds for network performance – a relevant set
of property rights and a credible commitment to them so that individuals will be able to
reap some of the benefits of their cooperative efforts creating the climate where trust
and a set of normative values emerge to support cooperation” (Milward and Provan,
200: 367).
In eschewing any major restructuring in the short term the current report acknowledges
the importance of structural stability in sustaining the trust which it rightly seeks to
engender. But the secure property rights which foster trust and engender cooperation
have already been seriously damaged by the original reforms’ philosophical emphasis
on the disciplines of quasi-markets, fragmentation, and competitive (rather than
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cooperative) relations. Were that not the case then the argument not to now engage in
major restructuring would be more compelling than it is. Nor does the New Zealand
experience demonstrate what might reasonably be defined as “continual change”. Since
the reforms both the State Sector Act and the Public Finance Act – the two statutory
pillars of the Public Service – have remained intact. Certainly there has been some
major restructuring among departments (notably in the fields of income support, social
work, and employment), but the magnitude of the sorts of problems addressed by the
current report requires important changes to both acts if those problems are to be
seriously addressed. Changes to such statutory components as the outputs/outcomes
dichotomy, the devolution of personnel policy to individual agencies, and the
contractual regime of appointments at top departmental levels, would be major
structural changes but changes whose magnitude is more commensurate with the size of
the problems the report identifies. Perhaps Etzioni’s (1967) “mixed scanning” model
offers an analogy: fundamental changes are needed from time to time, accompanied by
longer periods of incremental adjustments. The current report appears to confuse the
two, advocating inappropriate incremental means of responding to problems that call for
fundamental change.
When all is said and done, excessive fragmentation and misalignment invite a
commonsensical response – explicit structural reintegration. Why speak and act as if
they do not? Nevertheless, mindful of Einstein’s reported observation that
commonsense can be little more than the inability to learn from yesterday’s mistakes, a
little theoretical speculation may not be entirely amiss.
Reinventing a unified career service?
Peters’ (1986) metaphorical village having been burned in New Zealand, it now appears
that the current government would like it rebuilt. What goes around comes around. But
again there seems to be considerable ambivalence about the re-establishment of a
unified Public Service career service.
The current report is all about strengthening the center. It advocates those central
agencies “need to take more leadership, particularly on ‘whole of government’ matters”,
and leadership than is wider than just the Public Service (Report: 32-33). It calls for the
extension of the State Services Commissioner’s mandate to crown entities, and more
“leadership” by the SSC in “human resource matters, including the development of a
State sector wide human resource framework and promoting State sector values”
(Report: 33).
In other words, the center will be expected to play a much greater role in the longer-
term building of “institutional capacity”, which has by common consensus been
threatened by the fact that the original reforms unintentionally created strong incentives
for both ministers and officials to focus their attention on short-term exigencies
(resulting mainly from the output-purchasing nexus).
Again, the report identifies shortcomings which have resulted from the weakening of
the center and the abolition of a unified career service, but it suggests a “half-way
house” approach as a response. This could be seen as an interim, back-door, step
towards full reunification later, but the rhetoric of the report suggests that explicit
advocacy of reunification would run too obviously counter to the belief in managerial
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autonomy so central to the prevailing ideology. Yet if this rhetoric has been found to be
out of kilter with the reality of an inexorable accretion of “ankle-biting” accountability
mechanisms then the paradox may have to be addressed by a much more aggressive
structural reunification, but one which at the same time offers a more acceptable balance
between central control on the one hand and managerial autonomy on the other. In other
words, central agencies will need to be central in fact as well as in name.
Some (idle?) theoretical speculation
The problem of hierarchies versus markets can be restated as the difference between the
control that binds and the anxiety that divides. In New Zealand mechanistic
interpretations of a public service committed to serving the purposes of individual
ministers were substituted for organic interpretations of a public service committed to
the collective purposes and strategy of THE government. From this flowed
fragmentation and problems of alignment. The social capital and trust embedded over
time in an organic system of cooperative endeavor was quite quickly attenuated by the
competitive, anxiety-driven, self-protective and legalistic logic of the mechanistic
system built in its place. Putting it another way, economic incentives drove out solidary
ones. The reforms confirmed that trust is lost far more quickly than it can be built.
What to do? The mechanistic/organic distinction can be applied to networks at the
theoretical level. One possibility is stable and enduring organic networks in which
participants gain more than they lose, in terms of the values they consider to be
important to them, but which also serve a wider public interest.8 In this connection,
Bardach (1998: 17) defines interagency collaboration as “activities by agencies intended
to increase public value by having the agencies working together rather than
separately.” These networks to this end are characterized by strong reciprocal norms.
(Some might argue that they took the form of the proverbial “old boys networks”, which
were reputedly a feature of the old New Zealand system.) Another possibility is stable
and enduring mechanistic, that is formal, networks, which enable members to gain more
than they lose, and which also serve a wider public interest. These might be formally
constituted inter-agency committees, for example, which actually facilitate effective
coordinated co-production. A third possibility is organic systems in which people
actually lose more than they gain, but because of this these systems die on the vine quite
quickly. Fourthly, we may envisage mechanistic systems in which members gain more
than they lose, by way of turf protection and the like, but at the expense of the public
interest. The work of inter-departmental committees has often been interpreted in this
light. There are obviously other possible combinations.
Conceptually, organic and mechanistic systems are distinguishable, but in practice they
are closely inter-related. Strong mechanistic systems which produce net positive
benefits for members and the wider community, even though they may be (structurally)
abolished are likely to leave a strong organic footprint, for some time afterwards. (This
was probably evident in the persistence of strong cultural elements in the New Zealand
Public Service after the radical reforms.) Conversely, however, organic networks are
usually spontaneously created on the basis of trust and do not necessarily need to be
formalized in mechanistic arrangements. In fact, to do so may be to threaten the
cooperative trust that sustains them. The problem with trying to formally establish
mechanistic “super networks” is that ex ante calculations of transactions costs and of
gains and losses is too complex, information tends to be non-disclosable, and
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prospective participants will be wary and not open. This is especially true when such
deliberations have to take place in a culture of a priori distrust, when participants are
more inclined to think in zero-sum terms.
Bardach”s (1998: 16) observation needs to be acknowledged: “…if there is one
proposition on which consensus among students of public administration is firm and
widespread, it is that reorganization normally produces little of value at a very high cost
in time, energy, and personal anxiety”. But if a major reorganization is fundamentally
flawed in its conception, and gives rise to unacceptable unintended consequences then
further reorganization is essential to repair the damage. If the New Zealand government
is indeed serious about putting the Public Service back together again – that is,
enhancing mutually cooperative trust – then it needs to do so by way of a major
structural (mechanistic) realignment out of which more spontaneously cooperative
(organic) networks will develop.
CONCLUSION
The mechanistic zeitgeist of the original reforms undoubtedly generated some major
improvements in the operations of the New Zealand state sector, but it also produced a
number of unintended consequences (even reverse effects), which the present
government now seeks to remedy. Theoretical explicitness and apparent coherence is no
more immune to such effects as has been the case with the more pragmatic, theoretically
informal approach traditionally adopted in New Zealand to state sector development.
The latest reform proposals are problematic on one count, and disappointing on another.
They are problematic because they suggest superficial responses to more fundamental
problems. And they are disappointing because, while they constitute an attempt to
reconnect governmental agencies, they are disconnected from their original theoretical
sources. If the latter is a more general tendency in continuing attempts, in New Zealand
and elsewhere, to overcome emerging problems of state sector functionality, especially
in those systems which have in recent years been strongly influenced by theoretical
ideas closely associated with what became known as NPM, then this may represent a
more widespread reluctance to engage in a sensible reconsideration of theory in the light
of practice and experience.
In his comprehensive review of the New Zealand state sector reforms Scott (2001) has
commented: “Institutional analysis has provided useful insights and practical tools to
use in designing the institutions that are intended to give effect to government policies.
If this is to continue in the future, politicians need to ask for thorough analysis of
options and officials need to employ and improve their analytical techniques. In so
doing, practice will inform theory and the analytical frameworks will develop to meet
the increasingly more difficult challenges of tuning the public sector to perform better”
(Report: 35-36). It is not clear that the report discussed in this article is likely to
contribute to the further development of these analytical frameworks.
Its failure to revisit theoretical design in the light of about a dozen years of practical
experience in New Zealand may simply reflect the fact that the theoretical coherence of
the original reforms was something of an opportunistic aberration, since overtaken by
the pragmatic contingencies involved in getting on with the job. But Scott’s reference to
the “tuning” that is needed to make the public sector perform better itself suggests a
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general reluctance to reexamine critically the original theoretical underpinnings, the
deleterious effects that have sprung from them, and the consequent need for remedial
measures that are more drastic than those proposed in the current report.
Robert Gregory is Professor, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand. This article is a revised version of a paper included in the Conference
Proceedings of the IPSA Committee, Structure and Organisation of Government
Research, “Knowledge, Networks and Joined-Up Government,” University of
Melbourne, 3-5 June 2002.
APPENDIX
- From the Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Center, November 2001:
35-36.
What will be different in 5 years time for…..
…Ministers …Citizens …Staff
Through better integrated service delivery (Circuit Breaker Teams, regional
coordination and stronger policy/operations connections)…
Will see more innovative
solutions dealing with
longstanding problems.
Will find complex problems
get sorted out better. Will
feel well-served by public
servants.
Will see their views being
listened to and put into
action. Will find work more
satisfying.
Will hear fewer complaints
about coordination and
duplication.
Will notice that they are not
having to handle so many
government processes or
organizations.
Will see senior Wellington
people at the frontline, will
have more contact with
people in other sectors.
Will find that things happen
more quickly and smoothly
at the frontline.
Will feel that government in
Wellington feels less
distant.
Will notice that their views
get reflected in policy, will
feel connected to Welling-
ton.
Through less fragmentation (networks, structural change, accountability systems) ….
Will deal with fewer
agencies and noticeably
fewer barriers.
Will notice that duplication
is less.
Will be working with other
agencies more.
May find their previously
separate organization is
now part of a larger one.
Will find relating to the
public service simpler and
more straightforward.
May be working under
different management or in
a different organization.
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Will see less clutter, less
article, better information.
Will have to resolve conflict
amongst agencies less often.
Will understand the overall
vision and purpose better.
Through building People and culture (values and ethos, leadership, training, senior
management development, human resources strategy) ….
Will hear public servants
proud of their work and
positive about their
contribution.
Will gradually feel that the
public service is in good






Will feel more confident
that State sector staff
working at the front-line
understand and support
Government”s aspirations.
Will talk more proudly
about their jobs, and the
value of the State sector.
NOTES
1 For example, the Rankin case (Wallis, 2002); the Cave Creek tragedy (Gregory,
1998); the changing nature of ministerial-chief executive relationships (James, 2002);
accountability issues in regard to crown entities, including political scandals involving
executive “golden handshakes”.
2 James’ (2002) draft monograph, embodying the outcomes of a series of forums
involving ministers, chief executives, senior public officials and academics, found inter
alia that anonymity is no longer faceless in service of an all-powerful minister;
neutrality is gone in the sense that many public servants are active members of political
parties; loyalty has become problematic, and is now better understood as duty; and there
is a need for vigilance to ensure the traditional conventions do not fall so far out of step
with political and professional reality as to fall into disrepute and atrophy.
3 The Commissioner has noted that, “The net result is that separating policy advice and
service delivery may well have an initial beneficial impact on both the policy function
and on service delivery. But over time the separation may well create a situation where
a reversal of the separation seems desirable. Permanence is, I fear, an unattainable holy
grail” (SSC, 2001: 16).
4
“Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being
executed as it is being formed” (Friedrich, 1940: 6).
5 The Commissioner: “Two years ago I expressed my concern that in New Zealand we
had tended too quickly and too readily to assume that changing structures in the State
sector was the best way to address our problems…With the benefit of a further two
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years reflection, I now think that the multiplicity of organizations in some parts of the
State sector is inconsistent with the onerous stewardship responsibilities we place on
Responsible Ministers” (SSC, 2001: 14).
6 The Dominion, 1 January 2002.
7
„Under previous administrations, of either political persuasion, ministers used
discussions with officials at Cabinet Committee meetings to clarify the issues involved,
and the policy options open to the government. This did not apply across all policy
issues and each administration had its own preference and style as to how it worked.
Under the last administration [the fourth Labor government], involvement of officials
centred much more than in the past on discussions with departmental ministers rather
than participation in discussions at Cabinet Committee level. As a result, an atmosphere
was created which was antithetical to the tradition of consultation and co-ordination”
(Galvin, 1991: 49).
8 NPM approaches, because they tend to draw heavily from institutional economic and
accountancy theories, emphasize linear-rational, mechanistic or technological, inter-
pretations of the governing process. Much more cognizance should be given to the sort
of “norm-setting and norm-holding” (organic) systems depicted in the work of Sir
Geoffrey Vickers. He refers to the discovery by Western societies, “when unduly
influenced by technological models”, that “any group of people, even though gathered
together for a purely technological purpose, could not be organized as if they were no
more than constituents of a machine” (Vickers, 1983: 174).
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